Title:
A Judgment Against Time: When Legal Formalism Undermines Democratic Stability in Pre-Election Uganda
An Appraisal of the Nullification of MP Luyimbazi Nalukoola’s Victory in Kawempe North
In the matter of A Politically perishable decision.
By Isaac Christopher Lubogo
#Suigeneris
Preamble: The Verdict That Echoes Beyond the Bench
In a nation teetering on the edge of political exhaustion, economic fragility, and democratic skepticism, the High Court’s decision to nullify the parliamentary victory of Hon. Luyimbazi Elias Nalukoola in Kawempe North detonated not just in legal circles but in the conscience of the polity. With general elections barely months away, this judgment reverberates beyond its judicial scaffolding, striking at the heart of electoral integrity, institutional trust, and civic participation. It invites a deeper question: Can a judgment be legally correct yet democratically ruinous? And when law forgets its purpose, does it become complicit in the undoing of the very stability it claims to preserve?
The Toll of Legal Formalism on a Fatigued Polity
Ugandans, particularly the people of Kawempe North, are no strangers to electoral cycles marred by contestation, petitions, and security tension. To mandate a by-election at the twilight of a parliamentary term—despite a landslide margin of victory—is not only legally disproportionate, but emotionally exhausting for a people already cynical about the responsiveness of state institutions. It erodes voter morale, delegitimizes the value of participation, and amplifies the perception that the courts are increasingly becoming tools of procedural ambush rather than arbiters of public will.
Economically, the costs are even more absurd. Organizing a by-election in such proximity to a general election amounts to fiscal recklessness. At a time when the nation reels under budget deficits, inflation, and unmet health and education needs, redirecting billions into a by-election appears not just tone-deaf, but ethically indefensible.
De Minimis Non Curat Lex: When Courts Should Look Away from Trivialities
From a doctrinal standpoint, this case represented a textbook opportunity for the court to apply the principle of de minimis non curat lex—the idea that the law should not concern itself with trivialities, particularly where no material injustice has occurred. With a vote margin of 17,764 to 8,593, it is intellectually dishonest to suggest that any minor irregularities—unless demonstrably fraudulent—could have altered the outcome. Justice must not be reduced to a ritualistic exercise in formalism; it must instead embrace purpose, proportionality, and pragmatic coherence.
Indeed, Ugandan jurisprudence has seen judicial restraint applied in more controversial and consequential cases. In Mbabazi v. Museveni (2016), despite credible allegations of voter intimidation and abuse of state machinery, the Supreme Court declined to annul the election, citing the need for national stability. Similarly, in Besigye v. Museveni (2001 and 2006), the court acknowledged irregularities but chose continuity over correction. In Kabatsi v. Sseninde (2006), economic and administrative inconvenience was sufficient to override a proven case of electoral malpractice.
So the question is not whether the court could have chosen a less disruptive path—it is why it didn’t. Why does judicial restraint protect incumbents, yet precision is reserved for opposition victories? The answer lies not in law, but in alignment.
Judicial Selectivity and the Two-Tiered Rule of Law
There is a visible and worrying pattern: NRM victories, even where contested, tend to survive judicial scrutiny under the guise of public interest. Opposition victories, by contrast, are subject to stricter procedural demands and quicker nullification. This double standard is not only intellectually dissonant; it breeds dangerous levels of public distrust. When courts appear to apply one standard for the powerful and another for the challengers, legal legitimacy is converted into political theatre.
The Tenability of Appeal: Lawful in Form, Unworkable in Time
On paper, Hon. Luyimbazi’s appeal is both permissible and legitimate. Article 81(3) of the Constitution mandates a by-election within sixty days of a parliamentary vacancy. Section 63(2) of the Parliamentary Elections Act grants a thirty-day window to file an appeal. Rules 29, 30, and 31 of the Parliamentary Election Petition Rules further require that a Notice of Appeal be filed within seven days, served within another seven, and a Memorandum of Appeal be submitted within thirty.
So far, so good—if all timelines are met, the appeal is procedurally tenable. But herein lies the trap: even with technical compliance, the practical efficacy of the appeal is at the mercy of bureaucracy, judicial delay, and the Electoral Commission’s constitutional clock.
If the Notice of Appeal is filed late or improperly served, the appeal can be struck out before any hearing. If the certified record of proceedings is delayed—which is common, particularly in politically sensitive matters—the appellant cannot file the Memorandum in time. And even if everything is done correctly, the Court of Appeal is under no obligation to hear the matter before the sixty-day by-election deadline elapses. A stay of execution is discretionary. Without it, the EC may proceed, effectively rendering the appeal moot.
Further complicating this is Section 63(6) of the Act, which requires that every election petition and appeal be concluded within six months. While this sounds like a mechanism for timely justice, it becomes a ticking time bomb. If the appeal is heard and decided after the general elections in January 2026, even a favorable ruling for Luyimbazi becomes meaningless—the seat will have been dissolved, the political term expired, and the entire process rendered legally elegant but politically irrelevant.
The Irony of Legal Victory Without Political Redemption
It is therefore entirely possible—indeed probable—that Hon. Luyimbazi could win his appeal on merit and yet gain nothing. A reinstatement after a by-election has already taken place or after Parliament has been dissolved becomes a hollow gesture. Worse still, the appeal risks being overtaken by the national election, rendering it not only moot but absurd. Justice delayed in this context is not just denied—it is politically buried.
Conclusion: Law That Listens to Time, Not Just Text
What emerges is a painful paradox: The Ugandan legal framework offers avenues for appeal that are procedurally intact but structurally flawed. A valid appeal can be suffocated by rigid timelines, slow bureaucracies, and constitutional deadlines that prioritize order over justice. In such a system, the law becomes less an instrument of equity and more a choreography of technical defeat.
Uganda must confront this reality: that while legal remedies exist, they are often weaponized by time. Justice is promised but postponed, upheld yet undone, allowed in form but denied in consequence. This is not merely a flaw in electoral adjudication; it is a structural erosion of democratic faith.
And so we ask, with grave concern: What is the value of law if it arrives too late to matter? When legality becomes untethered from relevance, the courtroom becomes not a temple of justice, but a theatre of delayed truths.
The Constitution must not just guarantee justice—it must guarantee it in time. Otherwise, we do not have democracy; we have managed disenfranchisement dressed in legal robes.